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Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of conflict as a bargaining instru-
ment. It first revises the arguments explaining the role of confrontation
as a source of information and its use during negotiations. Then it of-
fers evidence illustrating this phenomenon by analyzing a sample of
colonial and imperial wars. The second part of the paper explores a
bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information. Parties can
choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in:
An absolute conflict that terminates the game or a limited conflict
that only introduces delay and conveys information about the even-
tual outcome of the absolute one. It is shown that confrontation has a
double-edged eﬀect: It may paradoxically open the door to agreement
when the uninformed party is so optimistic that no agreement is feasi-
ble. But it can also create ineﬃciency when agreement is possible but
the informed agent has an incentive to improve her bargaining position
by fighting.
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"War is [...] a true political instrument, a continuation of
political activity by other means."
Carl von Clausewitz, (1832), On war.
1 Introduction
Even in the presence of mutually beneficial settlements, disagreement is per-
vasive. This diﬃculty in reaching agreements, commonly known as the Hicks
paradox, has specially far-reaching consequences in those contexts where dis-
agreement entails some sort of confrontation. In legal disputes, labor nego-
tiations or international conflicts, a failure in striking a bargain provokes
losses of time and money, output, equipment and human lives. It is not sur-
prising then that understanding the bargaining process had become a key
question in Economics.
Incomplete information about critical aspects of the negotiation environ-
ment (e.g. reservation price, trial value, military power) has been systemat-
ically invoked as an explanation for this puzzle1. The bargaining literature
contains a plethora of models that have oﬀered important insights following
this approach2. One should, however, remain dissatisfied with the standard
incomplete information explanation. Take for instance two parties who are
about to engage in a conflict. It is plausible that the role of private in-
formation in preventing an agreement between them is much less important
when their observable levels of strength are very unequal3. But we can often
observe clearly small and weak countries or individuals fighting or litigat-
ing against much larger and powerful ones. We will here refer to this also
1Of course, this does not need to be the unique explanation: Fernandez and Glazer
(1991) show that delay can occur under full information too.
2For a very exhaustive survey of the literature see Ausubel et al. (2002).
3See Blainey (1973) and Wagner (1994).
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pervasive phenomenon as the Uneven contenders paradox.4
The present paper belongs to the economic tradition considering incom-
plete information as a powerful factor in negotiation processes. But it also
explores a complementary, and perhaps more basic, line of enquiry: In order
to understand how parties reach an agreement one should understand first
how they disagree. A more careful analysis of the nature of disagreement
reveals that conflict is part of the bargaining process and not only an alter-
native to it. This fresh look also oﬀers new answers to the Hicks paradox
and a consistent explanation to the puzzle of Uneven contenders.
In Section 2, we lay down the arguments that explain the role of conflict
as a source of information and its use as a bargaining instrument. We
conclude that if, due to its informative content, confrontation can be used
as a negotiation tool, some patterns revealing this use should be found in the
duration and termination of real conflicts. We then oﬀer empirical evidence
indicating the existence of such patterns by performing a duration analysis
on a sample of colonial and imperial wars.
Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of the use of conflict in negotiations by
constructing a simple two-stage bargaining model with one-sided incomplete
information. This model presents two main features. It allows parties to
choose between two types of conflicts: Absolute Conflict, equivalent to an
outside option and that ends the game when taken, and the Battle (inspired
by Clausewitz’s "Real" conflicts), that does not rule out the possibility of
reaching a settlement. The second ingredient of the model is incomplete
information: We assume that the actual balance of power is only known by
one side. Because parties’ winning probabilities in both types of conflicts are
a function of their relative strength, the Battle conveys information about
4This paradox was first noted by Clausewitz (1832)[1976].
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the eventual outcome of the Absolute Conflict.
Section 4 characterizes the set of equilibria of this game and presents the
main result of the paper: Limited confrontations have a double-edged eﬀect
in bargaining. When excessive optimism precludes agreement, the Battle
may be eﬃciency enhancing because it can make agreement more likely
and (partially) avoid Absolute Conflict. But when agreement is a priori
feasible, the informed agent may still trigger the Battle in order to improve
his bargaining position and ineﬃciency is created. This sheds new light on
the two paradoxes outlined above: Among the bargaining tools available
to them, parties may find limited confrontations too attractive for peace to
prevail. And even weak contenders may be willing to engage in conflict as
a way to extract concessions from mighty opponents.
The main message of this paper is thus that ordinary bargaining and
confrontation are two sides of the same phenomenon. Rather than being
substitutes, they are diﬀerent tools that the bargaining parties have at their
reach. Unions and countries engage in labor disputes or military conflicts
because these are other forms of bargaining. Conflict will be pervasive as
long as its returns as a bargaining instrument outweigh those of diplomacy.
2 Conflict as a bargaining instrument
2.1 The main argument
It is a bit surprising how the economic approach to disagreement still re-
mains strongly tailored by Nash’s seminal contribution. In his description
of the bargaining problem, Nash (1950) embeds disagreement in the threat
point, meant to be the outcome of a hypothetical non-cooperative game
played after parties fail to agree on how to share the surplus of cooperation.
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However, no information about that game or the forces that determine the
location of such point is incorporated into the description of the problem.
Several arguments put forward by political scientists and sociologists
suggest that economists should take a more careful look at the nature of
disagreement. This exercise reveals two important facts.
First, the conflicts often following disagreement are driven by the rela-
tive power of the parties. Examples are the renegotiation of the terms of a
contract between a soccer player and his club; the negotiations between two
countries on the division of some piece of territory; between workers and
management on wages; or simply how a just married couple will share the
chores. When parties fail to agree in these contexts they can resort to coer-
cive methods; they can go to court, they can go to war or strike; they can
divorce. And although the outcomes of these conflicts are typically noisy,
they depend on military strengths, the extent of the union membership or
the quality of the lawyers. That is, they depend on power. Consequently,
any sensible agreement will be conditioned by how the conflict ensuing dis-
agreement is resolved.5
Second, disagreement is not only an outside option. Parties actually
choose the scope and intensity of the conflicts they fight when disagree: In-
dia and Pakistan have not used nuclear weapons, only engaged in skirmishes;
Pepsi and Coca-cola do not fight worldwide price wars, but only national;
family arguments do not necessarily imply divorce. It was Clausewitz (1832)
who first made this observation and who coined the concepts (that we bor-
row) of Absolute war, uniquely intended to the destruction of the enemy,
5The economic literature has addressed this issue from a variety of perspectives: The
papers by Horowitz (1993), Anbarci et al. (2002) and Esteban and Sákovics (2002) admit
that bargaining occurs in the shadow of disagreement. However, they fail to explain the
actual occurrence of conflict mainly because they share a full information set-up. Other
contributions, like Banks (1990) and Bester and Wärneryd (1998), followed a mechanism
design approach but treated conflict as final.
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and Real war, "simply a continuation of political activity by other means."
This distinction is critical because after a limited (non-final) confrontation,
bargaining can resume. Therefore, to assume that only all-out conflicts are
possible prevents us to see that conflict is part of the bargaining process6.
Incomplete information plays a crucial role here because the imperfect
knowledge of the opponent’s strength turns limited conflicts into a bargain-
ing instrument. This possibility was first noticed by Simmel (1904), who
pointed out that since power is not easy to measure, the most eﬀective de-
terrent of conflict, the perfect revelation of relative strength, is only possible
through conflict itself. In this vein, Blainey (1973) referred to war as "the
stinging ice of reality" that helps to dissolve conflicting expectations about
its own outcome. The logic of the argument is summarized in the following
example: Suppose that two agents are uncertain about the strength of their
opponent in case of conflict, and that both parties are "strong" but believe
they are facing a "weak" rival. Then, no peaceful settlement can satisfy
both of them and the result of the negotiation is inevitably total confronta-
tion. But if parties can engage in a non-final conflict whose outcome is also
determined by their relative power, it will convey information about the true
balance of strengths and, perhaps, open the door to agreement.
Furthering this reasoning, Wittman (1979) noted that if conflict is a
source of information, disagreement might occur even if there is no optimism.
A limited confrontation that makes the opponent revise her beliefs, can
induce her to lower her demands. Hence, limited conflicts introduce delay
when incomplete information does not preclude agreement but parties fight
6With a few exceptions, economists have overlooked this point. Dasgupta and Maskin
(1989) explored the eﬀect of destructive power in bargaining in a model where parties
can destroy parts of the bargaining set without terminating the game. In a similar spirit
to ours, Cramton and Tracy (1992) presented a model in which unions can choose the
intensity of the dispute by opting between strikes and holdouts.
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in order to obtain advantage at the bargaining table. This double-edged
eﬀect of conflict in negotiations is the central point of the present paper.7
2.2 Illustrative evidence
We next present empirical evidence illustrating the arguments outlined above.
The aim of this exercise is to substantiate the claims put forward in the pre-
vious Section and to motivate the formal analysis of the next one.
If confrontation reveals information about the parties involved, some
pattern in their duration and termination should indicate it8. Following
this line of reasoning, our hypothesis here will be that whenever incomplete
information is relevant, real conflicts should display an increasing hazard
rate, that is, they should be more likely to end the more they last.
Two factors suggest that the probability of a dispute ending should in-
crease over time. First, the returns of conflict as a bargaining tool should
decrease as more skirmishes are fought because if standard Bayesian updat-
ing were employed, one additional victory would induce an increasingly neg-
ligible change in beliefs. Hence, as long as battles are costly or future rents
discounted, there must exist a certain point in time from which no more lim-
7 In International Relations, Wagner (2000) incorporated both Clauswetiz’s and
Blainey’s ideas into an incomplete information set-up but did not carry a full formal
analysis. In Economics, Mnookin and Wilson (1998) provided a model of costly pretrial
discovery, a procedure that, although is not a conflict avant la lettre, can be used as a
signaling device by the discovering party. These authors explicitly chose not to consider
this possibility in their model.
8Several empirical studies have corroborated this point. Schnell and Gramm (1987)
demonstrated the existence of a "learning by striking" phenomenon in wage negotiations,
proved by the negative relation between lagged strike experience and the likelihood of
further strikes. Box-Steﬀensmeier et al. (2003) showed that peace is more likely to break
down between two states who fought a war that ended in a stalemate than when it did
not and that this eﬀect weakens over time. On the other hand, Goemans (2000) used a set
of case studies from World War I to track how the estimates of several contenders about
their relative strength evolved as fighting proceed. Setbacks forced them to lower their
estimates whereas successes made them more optimistic and increased their demands.
Interestingly enough, the author provides historical records proving that the German
leadership explicitly designed their attack at Verdun not to decisively defeat the French
but to influence France’s estimate of its own relative strength.
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ited confrontations are worth fighting. On the other hand, in the long run,
the more the parties fight the sharper their estimates of the true balance of
strengths, and the closer they are to a complete information scenario where
agreement is immediate. These observations lead to the conclusion that the
use of confrontation as a bargaining instrument is a self-limiting phenom-
enon. This is equivalent to the concept of positive duration dependence in
the language of duration analysis.9
In order to investigate the possible existence of this pattern, we perform
a duration analysis on a sample of 94 colonial and imperial wars that took
place between 1817 and 1988. These wars were mainly caused by states
aiming to expand and acquire new colonies or by dependencies trying to
change their subordinate status. Hence, one can assume that the two sides
were implicitly bargaining over a piece of territory or over the degree of
autonomy of the non-state side. Our data come from the Extra-systemic
wars dataset of the 3.0 Correlates of War (COW) project database (Sarkees,
2000). Well-known examples of these disputes are the Boer wars, the Zulu
wars, the Mahdi uprising and the Algerian war of independence. A summary
of the cases considered and of the changes made on the original database
can be found in the Appendix B.
Without entering into too many technical details (see Appendix B), this
analysis estimates the hazard rate for these conflicts by taking war duration,
measured in months, as the dependent variable. A logistic functional form
for this rate is assumed and estimated. This function includes several time
interactions in order to investigate how the hazard rate changes over time.
We do not intend to claim that the set of Extra-systemic wars as a whole
displays an increasing hazard rate. After all, duration dependence is just
9Note that this conclusion is reinforced if limited conflicts can themselves result in one
side fully defeating the other or if they have accumulative costs.
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theoretically unexplained variance. Instead, we must try to establish that
any duration dependence found is due to the reasons conjectured.
If conflict was indeed used in order to change the opponents’ beliefs and
measures of such beliefs existed, their inclusion in the analysis would make
duration dependence vanish (and the hazard rate flat). Given that such
measures do not exist, we will use the termination mode of the conflict as
a way to identify those cases whose hazard rate we expect to be increasing:
We classify the disputes in the sample depending on whether they ended
or not with a negotiated agreement. We employ the type of ending as an
(imperfect) measure of the importance of the bargaining component of the
conflict: Wars where confrontation was used as a bargaining tool (and there-
fore, for which our conjecture applies to) should be more likely to populate
the agreement category. The rest of wars were mostly pure military contests
where little or none bargaining took place and where incomplete information
was probably irrelevant.
Because we want to analyze diﬀerent termination modes, we estimate a
competing risks model, where one hazard rate is estimated for each type of
ending, Agreement vs. No agreement. We follow Bennett and Stam (1996)
and Ravlo et al. (2003) when constructing the set of variables to be included
as controls. For simplicity we use the same vector covariates in both risks. A
positive (negative) coeﬃcient implies that the covariate increases (decreases)
the corresponding hazard rate. Again, we refer the reader to Appendix B
for details.
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of the single risk model
(first column), that does not distinguish between the two termination modes,
and of the competing risks model10. A quick examination of the log-likelihood
10 In the estimation of these models we employed the 6.4 version of TDA (Transition Data
Analysis), developed by Blossfled and Rohwer (1995). This software is specially designed
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Table 1:
Estimates of the single and competing risks logistic hazard rate models
Competing risks model  
Variables 
 
Single risk model  No agreement Agreement 
Constant -4.086 (0.360)***   -4.543 (0.512)***     -4979 (0.593)*** 
Average Deaths   0.264 (0.092)***     0.314 (0.117)***      0.262 (0.153)* 
Stable democracy   0.158 (0.305)**     0.756 (0.431)*     -0.450 (0.475) 
Military personnel   0.283 (0.397)*    -0.273 (0.642)      0.879 (0.527)* 
Casualties ratio   0.888 (0.487)**     0.458 (0.689)      1.281 (0.730)* 
Population   0.290 (0.345)     0.857 (0.483)*     -1.354 (1.302) 
Decolonization war  -1.335 (0.299)***   -1.410 (0.443)***     -1.248 (0.429)*** 
Previous disputes  -0.597 (0.263)**    -0.363 (0.333)     -0.815 (0.417)** 
Number of colonies   0.023 (0.011)**     0.061 (0.014)      0.047 (0.018)*** 
Time interaction   0.004 (0.004)    -0.008 (0.006)      0.012 (0.005)*** 
    
Log-likelihood      -397.882                    -452.329  
-2(Lnull-Lmodel)         43.249                       64.431  
N            94                      94  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. One asterisk indicates p<0.10, two indicate 
p<0.05 and three indicate p<0.01. 
shows that both models greatly improve upon the null one. The evidence
however favors the competing risk approach: The data reject the hypothesis
that the two cause-specific hazards are equal.11
We ask the reader to concentrate on the coeﬃcient of the time interaction
for the two models. As hypothesized, wars that terminated in agreement
display an increasing hazard rate, captured by the positive and significant
coeﬃcient of its time interaction12. The wars we identified as likely sce-
for Duration analysis and it is available at http://steinhaus.stat.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/.
11The likelihood-ratio test statistic for this hypothesis is 2(LCR −LSR −N ln 12 ) where
LCR and LSR are the log-likelihood of the competing risks and single risks models respec-
tively. The term N ln 1
2
is the adjustment factor that allows the direct comparison between
the two models. This statistic equals 21.417 and and has an associated p-value< 0.02.
12We estimated several models with time interactions of higher order: There was no
significative improvement when the quadratic and the cubic specifications were estimated.
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narios for the use of confrontation in bargaining, present positive duration
dependence. On the contrary, those wars that ended in the total collapse of
one of the parties display a flat hazard rate. On the other hand, the single
risk model finds no duration dependence at all. This result suggests that
the termination modes capture diﬀerences in the aims and conduct of wars
that need to be controlled for.13
The sharp diﬀerences in duration patterns uncovered by this analysis
are consistent with the use of conflict in negotiations and support our initial
hypothesis. The improvement made when moving from the single risk to the
competing risks model indicates that the termination modes are supplying
relevant information. On the other hand, the existence of positive duration
dependence only in the case of the conflicts that ended in agreement indicates
the presence of unexplained variance; a variance that is absent from the
no agreement category where we did not expect conflict to be used as a
bargaining instrument.14
3 The model
In the remainder of the paper, we explore a formal model that studies the role
of conflict as a bargaining instrument. Its main ingredients are incomplete
information and the coexistence of limited and final confrontations.
Consider a game, denoted by G [δ, θ] , where two risk neutral players
bargain over the division of a cake worth one euro. We will assign to P1
the male gender and the female gender to P2. This game has two periods
13These results cannot be attributed to "Unobserved Heterogeinity" (Kiefer, 1988) since
this problem cannot spuriously generate positive duration dependence.
14Our results contrast with the U-shaped or declining settlement rates obtained for
strikes (Kennan and Wilson, 1989) and cast some doubts on the lack of duration depen-
dence found for interstate wars by Bennett and Stam (1996), who only estimated the
pooled (single risk) hazard rate for these conflicts.
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t = 1, 2. Players are impatient and discount the future at a common factor
δ ∈ (0, 1]. There is a parameter p ∈ {pL, pH} denoting the relative strength
of player P1 in case of confrontation and such that 1 > pH > pL > 0. P1
knows his own relative strength but it is unknown to P2, who believes at
the beginning of the game that p = pH with probability 12 .
At t = 1, P1 chooses an action in {A,B, x(1)}, where x(1) ∈ [0, 1] is an
oﬀer of the share of the cake to P2. A is the option of Absolute Conflict
that ends the game, and B means that a Battle between the two players is
fought, making the game proceed to t = 2. In that period, the only available
actions are {A,x(2)}, where x(2) is the share of the cake oﬀered to P2.
P2 only moves if P1 makes an oﬀer. In that case, her available actions
are {Accept, Reject}. If P2 accepts, agreement is reached at that period.
Rejection triggers A.
An Absolute Conflict is a "fight to the finish", a confrontation in which
both parties perfectly commit to defeat their opponent.15 Therefore, it
necessarily ends the game. We model this conflict as a costly lottery whose
payoﬀs depend on the realization of p: With such probability P1 wins and
P2 is defeated. This confrontation entails a fixed loss: The value of the cake
reduces to 0 < θ ≤ 1. The payoﬀs from A, conditional on p, are thus
d = (d1, d2) = (θp, θ(1− p)) p = pL, pH .
On the other hand, the Battle is a conflict of limited scope that does
not entail the end of the game: Nature simply announces a winner and the
second period is reached. The outcome of the Battle is a function of the
15 In these conflicts, parties aim to render the opponent defenseless, either directly or by
delegating to a third party. Here we assume that this is done directly, like in the case of
wars, so the winner is able to impose her most preferred outcome without opposition. If
this were achieved indirectly, as in court for instance, the final outcome would only reflect
the winner’s maximal aspirations partially.
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Figure 1: Partial tree representation of the game
relative strength p too. For simplicity, we will assume that P1’s Battle win-
ning probability is precisely p (and 1− p for P2).16
We will refer to the outcome of the Battle from P1’s point of view, either
Victory (V) or Defeat (D). Notice that since p is unknown to P2, the outcome
of the Battle conveys information about the true balance of strengths.17
Oﬀers constitute an additional source of information. They can be pool-
ing, meanins that both types of P1 make them, or separating, in which case
P1’s true type is revealed. The key diﬀerence between these two sources of
information is that whereas oﬀers are typically used to misrepresent the own
type, the outcome of the Battle is noisy but not subject to manipulation; it
depends only on the parties’ true relative strength.
16This assumption can be relaxed. It is enough to assume that the Battle winning
probabilities are a function of p and that this function is known by the uninformed party.
17We abstract from any particular interpretation of the Battle. This comes at the price
of ignoring the non-informational gains that limited confrontations can generate.
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Beliefs consist of a probability distribution µ(· | h(t)) over the set of
types that depends on the history of the game h(t), that includes both the
oﬀers eventually made and the outcome of the Battle. At period t, P2’s
expected payoﬀ from disagreement following history h(t) is thus
E(d2 | h(t)) = θ(1−E(p | h(t))) = θ(1−pH ·µ(p = pH | h(t))−pL·µ(p = pL | h(t))).
Note that if P2’s beliefs after history h(t) make her too optimistic about
her probability of winning A, the sum of the perceived disagreement payoﬀs
may be greater than one and this renders agreement impossible.
Definition 1 Agreement is said to be feasible following history h(t) when-
ever the sum of (expected) disagreement payoﬀs does not exceed the size of
the cake, that is, whenever
1 ≥ E(d2 | h(t)) + θp (1)
≥ θ(1−E(p | h(t))) + θp.




≥ p−E(p | h(t)), (2)
so the Loss ratio (Q) must exceed the diﬀerence between the actual and
P2’s expected value of p. As the Loss ratio increases even a very optimistic
P2 does not expect to get much from A and agreement becomes feasible.
A strategy for P1 in this game is a function σ1(p) mapping the set of
histories and types into the set of actions {A,B, x(1), x(2)}; similarly, a
strategy for P2 is a function σ2 mapping histories into {Accept, Reject}.
Now, one can apply the standard solution concept for this kind of games.
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Definition 2 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game G [δ, θ]
is a strategy profile (σ∗1(p), σ
∗
2) and posterior beliefs µ(· | h(t)) such that
σ∗1(p) maximizes P1’s continuation value of the game for each h(t) and for
each type, P2 accepts xt if and only if xt ≥ E(d2 | h(t)) and µ(· | h(t)) is
consistent with σ∗1(p) via Bayes’ rule.
4 Characterization of equilibria
In this Section, we first discuss the benchmark version of the game above in
which P1 simply makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to P2 and the Battle is not
available. Then we characterize the PBE of the full-fledged game G [δ, θ].
In the last part of the Section, we compare these two games and discuss the
role and eﬀects of limited confrontation in bargaining.
4.1 The benchmark case
Suppose that the Battle is not available so any confrontation in the game is
final. P1 can either trigger A or make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. This gives
rise to two diﬀerent type of equilibria, Separating or Pooling.
In a Separating equilibrium, the L-type makes a fully revealing oﬀer. He
can reveal his true type by making an oﬀer x such that
1− x ≤ θpH ,
because the H-type would never make it.
In a Pooling equilibrium, both types of P1 make the same oﬀer. In this
case, given the initial beliefs, the minimal acceptable oﬀer is simply




In the next Theorem, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
of this game. Recall that under this solution concept we need to specify
not only strategies but also P2’s beliefs, including those oﬀ-the-equilibrium-
path since Bayes’ rule imposes no restriction on them. Throughout the
paper we will support these PBE with the largest possible set of parameters
by employing "optimistic" (from P2’s viewpoint) beliefs when necessary.
Theorem 0 (Take-it-or-leave-it-game) In the one-period version of the
game G [δ, θ] with no battle,
(i) If the Loss ratio is not too high, i.e. Q ≤ [pH−pL], there is a Separating
PBE in which the H-type triggers A, the L-type oﬀers xL = θ(1− pL)
and P2 accepts and holds beliefs µ(p = pL | x 6= xL) = 1.
(ii) If agreement is feasible, i.e. Q ≥ 12 [pH−pL], then there exists a Pooling
PBE in which both types of P1 oﬀer xP and P2 accepts.
Proof. Given the previous discussion, the separating oﬀer must be
x = max{1− θpH , θ(1− pL)},
because any oﬀer to be accepted by P2 must satisfy x ≥ θ(1− pL).
However, when Q > [pH−pL], i.e. 1−θpH > θ(1−pL), separation cannot
be sustained because the H-type prefers to settle rather than to trigger A.
He is better oﬀ by doing so even if he were to be confused with the L-
type. Hence, no oﬀ-the-equilibrium path beliefs can support a Separating
equilibrium in that case.
On the other hand, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the pooling
oﬀer to be an equilibrium is that the H-type must prefer to make it rather
16
than to trigger A, that is
1− θ(1− pL + pH
2
) ≥ θpH ⇒ Q ≥
1
2
[pH − pL]. (3)
The main implication of this Theorem is that when no agreement is
feasible, i.e. Q < 12 [pH − pL], only the Separating equilibrium exists and it
entails an eﬃciency loss: Absolute Conflict occurs half of the time because
P2 is excessively optimistic when P1 is of theH-type. Full eﬃciency however
can be recovered when agreement is feasible because an oﬀer dominating
agents’ expected payoﬀs from Absolute Conflict exists. So when conflict is
always final, confrontation occurs only if agreement is not feasible.
4.2 Pooling by battles
We now analyze the PBE of the game G [δ, θ] . First, we show that the
equilibria characterized in Theorem 0 still exist. In order to sustain them,
we will employ the following "optimistic" beliefs
µ(p = pL | h(1) = B) = 1. (4)
The following Corollary extends Theorem 0 to the full-fledged version of
the game.
Corollary 1: In the game G [δ, θ] and if P2 holds the oﬀ-the-equilibrium
beliefs in (4):
(i) If Q ≤ [pH − pL], there exists a Separating PBE in which at t = 1 the
L-type makes an oﬀer and the H-type triggers A.
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(ii) If Q ≥ 12 [pH − pL], there exists a Pooling by oﬀers PBE in which
both types of P1 make the same oﬀer at t = 1.
Note that the existence of these equilibria only depends on the value of
Q and not on the discount rate δ.
Let us now focus our attention on the equilibria in which both types of
P1 fight the Battle in order to alter P2’s beliefs.
Definition 3 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game G[δ, θ] is called
Pooling by battles if both types of P1 trigger the Battle at period t = 1.
The H-type is the one with more incentives to fight the Battle: It can
help him to overcome the disadvantageous position he is in due to incomplete
information. On the other hand, the weak type can obtain extra benefits by
mimicking him, thanks to the noisy information transmitted by the Battle.
The second period of the game is final and then almost identical to the
benchmark scenario; separating or pooling oﬀers can again take place. These
diﬀerent equilibria will arise depending on who won the Battle. Intuitively,
Victory gives more room to a pooling oﬀer since the more pessimistic P2 is,
the lower her minimal acceptable oﬀer. Under Defeat however, P2 becomes
more demanding and it is more likely that the H-type will prefer to trigger
A instead. In that case, we should expect separation to prevail.
Definition 4 A Pooling by battles PBE is called 1) full if in the second
period both types make the same oﬀer; and 2) with partial separation if
both types make the same oﬀer under V but only the L-type makes an oﬀer
under D.
Therefore, the occurrence of pooling or separation at t = 2 crucially
depends on P2’s beliefs after the Battle. Conditional on its outcome, they
are simply
18





µ(p = pH/ Defeat) =
1− pH
2− pH − pL
= q−. (6)
The importance of these beliefs will be made clear below.
In order to support the Pooling by battles profile as a PBE we will again
employ "optimistic" beliefs18. So deviations from the equilibrium profile will
convince P2 she is facing the weak opponent, that is
µ(p = pL | h(1) 6= B) = 1. (7)
We are finally in the position of stating our main Theorem characterizing
the Pooling by battles PBE. This characterization is made by means of the
two parameters of the model, the Loss ratio, Q, and the discount factor, δ.
The discount factor becomes important here because if P1 is too impatient,
he may prefer to take the outside option or settle immediately.
Theorem 1 (The Battle as a bargaining tool) In the game G [δ, θ] and
if P2 holds the optimistic oﬀ-the-equilibrium beliefs in (7):
(i) For intermediate values of the Loss ratio ( (1 − q+)[pH − pL] ≤ Q ≤
(1 − q−)[pH − pL]) there is a threshold discount rate δ such that if
δ ≥ δ a Pooling by battles PBE with partial separation exists.
(ii) For moderately high values of the Loss ratio (Q ≥ (1 − q−)[pH − pL])
there is a threshold discount rate δ such that if δ ≥ δ a Full pooling
by battles PBE exists.
18A diﬀerent set of beliefs would not change qualitatively our results.
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Figure 2: Representation of the PBE characterized in Corollary 1 and Theorem 1
The proof of this Theorem and of Corollary 1 can be found in the Appen-
dix A. Figure 2 depicts one possible configuration in the parameter space.
4.3 Discussion
Theorem 1 fully describes the taxonomy of PBE of our game. Observe that
the existence of the Pooling by battles equilibrium is determined by two
factors. First, the Loss ratio should be high enough; otherwise, Absolute
Conflict is too attractive for theH-type. Second, the diﬀerential of strengths
[pH−pL] should not be too big, because in that case the Battle would become
too informative, nor too small, because the change in beliefs induced by the
Battle would become negligible.
The reader may find surprising that a two-period separation profile, in
which the weak type settles immediately and the strong one fights the Battle,
cannot be an equilibrium. The reason is straightforward: In that profile, the
outcome of the Battle is totally irrelevant; whenever it takes place, P2 knows
for sure she is facing the strong type. But then the weak type would deviate
and fight as well unless the discount rate is very low. And this in turn
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would make the strong type prefer to settle immediately too. Notice that
this result is quite general: it applies to versions of the game with a richer
support of the type space and more than one battle. It implies that even
if multiple battles were available, all types must stop fighting battles at the
same time in any equilibrium.
Bur more importantly, Theorem 1 uncovers the double-edge eﬀect of
conflict in our model.
For low values of the Loss ratio (Q < (1− q+)[pH − pL]) the Pooling by
battles profile cannot be supported under any of the two outcomes of the
Battle and the H-type always triggers A. In this case, we are back in the
world where the lack of feasible agreements inevitably precipitates conflict.
When the loss from A is high enough, the Battle can facilitate agreement
because a defeat changes P2’s beliefs enough to make agreement feasible. If a
settlement was not feasible in the first place, and the discount rate is not too
low, this limited confrontation can be paradoxically eﬃciency enhancing:
The strong type uses the Battle to state his true strength and obtain a
settlement in the second period, thus (partially) avoiding the ineﬃciency
caused by Absolute Conflict. Meanwhile, the weak type attempts to get a
concession by mimicking.
But when the value of Q is such that agreement is feasible, if P1 triggers
confrontation the Battle introduces a delay that is absent from the Pooling
by oﬀers scenario. This is rational, because the Battle can grant him further
advantage at the bargaining table, but it is socially ineﬃcient.
These results oﬀer an explanation for the pervasiveness of conflict in
negotiations: The feasibility of agreement is a necessary but not a suﬃcient
condition for a settlement to be reached. Limited or absolute confrontations
will be observed not only when agreement is impossible but also whenever a
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settlement is feasible but the returns of resorting to conflict are higher than
the returns from diplomacy.
5 Further remarks
We have presented a simple model exploring the role of conflict as part of
the bargaining process, a role, we believe, that is common to many contexts.
One of the main results derived from this model is the existence of a double-
edged eﬀect of confrontation in negotiations, an eﬀect that sheds new light
on some of the most puzzling aspects of real disputes.
Regarding the Uneven contenders paradox, we argued that weak agents
fight much stronger ones as a way of extracting better terms from them.
This happens even when these agents have little chance of victory in case of
going to trial, engaging in a salvage strike or fighting an absolute war.
On the other hand, the puzzle that motivates the Hicks paradox comes
from the definition of "mutually beneficial" agreements as those that domi-
nate the outcome of an all-out conflict. This definition neglects that parties
have other instruments available. An agreement may not be mutually ben-
eficial when compared to what parties can get by fighting a skirmish that
will aﬀect their opponent’s expectations. Rational agents will engage in lim-
ited confrontations whenever the returns from doing so are higher than the
returns from "diplomacy".
Finally, some comments on robustness and extensions are in order. We
have presented a stylized view of real-world negotiation processes that is
hence potentially subject to multiple criticisms. One set of objections refers
to the two-point support of the type space, the other to the particular struc-
ture of moves and information selected. Yet, we think that the simplicity of
the ideas behind our model make it robust to these plausible concerns.
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A richer support of the type space would of course change the exact
conditions giving rise to the diﬀerent PBE, but they would produce qualita-
tively the same results. For instance, with a continuum of types separation
would entail the existence of a cut-oﬀ type such that P1 makes an oﬀer if
p is below it and triggers Absolute conflict otherwise. This threshold would
vary depending on when this (partial) separation occurs and on the outcome
of the Battle. But such extension would not generate new equilibria19. As
discussed in Section 4.3, the impossibility of an equilibrium involving a two-
period separation, in which weak types settle immediately and the stronger
ones engage in the Battle, can be generalized well beyond our set-up.
On the other hand, as any game in extensive form, ours employs a very
specific protocol that can be generalized in many possible directions. How-
ever, most of the alternatives are either intractable or do not add much to
the main message of the paper. For instance, it is easy to see that increasing
the number of periods, and hence the number of possible battles, has no big
impact on the results, at least if p remains constant. Battles in that case
would become a sort of branching process. This would in turn lead to an
complex division of the parameter space in regions where diﬀerent Pooling
by battles profiles, contingent on the number of victories attained at each
point in time, can be supported in equilibrium and coexist (let us insist that
all types would stop fighting at once anyway). We admit that if multiple
battles can make p change, results might diﬀer substantially. However, it is
not clear at all how p would vary with the events at the battlefield: Some-
times an initial defeat precipitates the collapse of the loser but others it
increases her conflict eﬀort. Still, this possibility deserves further analysis.
The reader may also argue that by assuming that every oﬀer is final we
19Apart from a rather uninteresting fully revealing equilibrium in the case of a continuum
of types.
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avoid further signalling through rejected P1’s oﬀers. We claim that this is
assumed without loss of generality: If P2 also had the option of rejecting
the oﬀer and triggering a battle, all oﬀers would be either uninformative
or accepted in equilibrium. Any informative oﬀer would make P2 more
optimistic. Therefore, P1 cannot gain anything from such oﬀer.
Another modification would be to switch roles so the uninformed party
is the one who makes oﬀers. This would lead to a scenario where battles are
used to screen the opponent rather than as a signaling device. This is a very
interesting possibility that we intend to explore in future research. A further
extension to a two-sided incomplete information framework does not seem
to add enough insights to compensate the cost of increasing complexity.
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A Appendix
Theorem A In the game G [δ, θ] there exist two threshold discount rates δ
and δ such that
(i) If (1 − q+)[pH − pL] ≤ Q ≤ (1 − q−)[pH − pL] and δ ≥ δ then there
is a Pooling by battles PBE with partial separation in which P2
accepts xV (2) under V and xL(2) under D and believes that µ(p =
pL | h(1) 6= B) = 1.
(ii) If Q ≥ 12 [pH−pL] then there exists a Pooling by oﬀers PBE in which
P2 accepts xP (1) and her beliefs are µ(p = pL | h(1) = B) = 1.
(iii) If Q ≥ (1− q−)[pH − pL] and δ ≥ δ then there is a Full pooling by
battles PBE in which P2 accepts xV (2) under V and xD(2) under D
and hold beliefs µ(p = pL | h(1) 6= B) = 1.
(iv) If Q ≤ [pH−pL] a Separating PBE exists in which the H-type triggers
A, P2 accepts xL(1) and holds beliefs µ(p = pL | h(1) 6= x(1)) = 1.
Proof. In order to prove this Theorem, let us first consider all the possible
actions that both types of P1 can take at period t = 1.
a) L-type triggers A: It is easy to see that for the L-type, triggering A is
always a dominated action. He could instead oﬀer θ(1 − pL) and end up
better oﬀ since P2 will accept that oﬀer.
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b) L-type makes an oﬀer : If the H-type makes an oﬀer too, it is easy to
see that it must be the same oﬀer (the two-type assumption precludes the
construction of a fully revealing schedule of oﬀers). Hence, we are in the
Pooling by oﬀers scenario (case (ii)). This profile can be supported as an
equilibrium when condition (3) holds because the optimistic beliefs ensure
that if P1 deviates from this profile he will get at most δ(1− θ(1− pL)) <
1− θ(1− pL+pH2 ) = 1− xP (1).
The second option is the separating profile in which the L-type makes
an oﬀer and the H-type triggers the Battle. This one cannot be sustained
as a PBE. Notice first that it would require the L-type not to mimic and
battle as well, i.e. δ ≤ Q+pLQ+pH . But the H-type should not prefer to oﬀer
θ(1−pL) because it is always accepted, and this requires exactly the opposite
condition! Hence, a two-period separation of types cannot be a PBE.
It only remains to consider the case where the L-type makes an oﬀer
and the H-type triggers A (case (iv)). We must check that it is not in
the interest of the H-type to trigger the Battle even if P2 holds optimistic
beliefs; that is, we need to check that
θpH ≥ δ(1− θ(1− pL)),
implying the condition δ ≤ pHQ+pL .
But the existence of a Separating equilibrium does not only need this
condition to hold true. This profile cannot be an equilibrium when Q ≥
pH − pL since the H-type would be better of by oﬀering θ(1− pL) at t = 1
than by fighting A (P2 will always accept that oﬀer). Notice however that
pH
Q+pL
≥ 1 when Q < pH − pL, implying that the restriction on δ has no bite
in this region. Therefore, only the condition Q < pH − pL must be met in
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order to support a Separating PBE.
c) L-type fights the Battle: First we show that if the Battle is fought both
types must do so. Suppose the H-type makes an oﬀer instead. Then the
weak type would be better oﬀ by mimicking him. Suppose now that the
H-type triggers A but the L-type fights the Battle; for this separation to be
sustainable, the H-type should not prefer to fight the Battle as well. This




We know that this restriction has bite only when Q > pH − pL, but in
that case it is not optimal for the H-type to trigger A since he would prefer
to oﬀer θ(1−pL). Therefore, both types must trigger the Battle. This is the
Pooling by battles profile.
Now we obtain conditions that support Pooling by battles as a PBE of
the game. Let us derive the pooling oﬀers under both outcomes V and D.
Given beliefs (5) and (6), one can compute the minimal acceptable oﬀers for
P2 under each outcome. Under V this oﬀer is






whereas under D it is
xD(2) = θ(1− pHq− − pL(1− q−)) = θ(1−
pH(1− pH) + pL(1− pL)
2− pH − pL
).
Note that xV (2) < xD(2). It is immediate to see that for Pooling to be
sustainable, both types must prefer to make the minimal acceptable oﬀer
xj(2) to A. The following auxiliary Lemma characterizes this necessary
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condition.
Lemma A1 At the second period of the game G [δ, θ]
(i) If Q ≥ (1−q−)[pH−pL], pooling can be supported under both outcomes
V and D.
(ii) If (1−q+)[pH−pL] ≤ Q ≤ (1−q−)[pH−pL], pooling can be supported
under V only. Under D, separation prevails.
(iii) If Q < (1−q+)[pH−pL] pooling cannot be supported and separation
occurs under both V and D.
Proof. Let us consider the two possible outcomes of the Battle. Under V,







) ≥ θpH ,
that can be rewritten into




This condition is equivalent to (2) under this outcome. Similarly, under
outcome D we need
1− θ(1− pH(1− pH) + pL(1− pL)
2− pH − pL
) ≥ θpH ⇔
1− pL
2− pH − pL




that note that again coincides with the condition on the feasibility of agree-
ment under D.
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We also need P1 not to be so impatient he prefers to trigger A. Formally,




where E[vi] is the expected continuation value of the game for type i. The
next Lemma characterizes the set of parameters that satisfy these conditions.
Lemma A2 There exist two threshold discount rates δ1 ≤ 1 and δ3 ≤ 1
such that
(i) If pooling is only sustainable under V, condition (8) holds if and only if
δ ≥ δ1.
(ii) If pooling is sustainable under both V and D condition (8) holds if and
only if δ ≥ δ3.
Proof. We saw above that when Q < (1− q+)[pH − pL] there is separation
under both outcomes of the Battle because the H-type prefers A to the
pooling oﬀer. Given this, H-type’s optimal action is to trigger A at t = 1.
Hence, the first necessary condition for Pooling by battles to prevail is Q ≥
(1− q+)[pH − pL].
Once in this region, if Q ≤ (1− q−)[pH − pL], condition (8) reduces to
δ ≥ θpH
pH(1− xV (2)) + (1− pH)θpH
=
1
1 +Q− (1− q+)[pH − pL]
= δ1,
because straightforward algebra shows that if condition (8) holds for type H
so it does for the type L. Note that δ1 ≤ 1 whenever Q ≥ (1− q+)[pH − pL].
This threshold is decreasing and convex in Q.
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When there is pooling at both states (Q ≥ (1− q−)[pH − pL]) condition
(8) boils down to
δ ≥ θpH
1− pHxV (2)− (1− pH)xD(2)
=
pH
Q+ pH − pH(1−pH)+pL(1−pL)(pH+pL)(2−pH−pL) [pH − pL]
= δ3,
because again, only the condition for the H-type needs to be checked. Note
that δ3 < 1 in this area. This threshold is also decreasing and convex in Q.
Simple computations show that δ1 = δ3 when Q = (1− q−)[pH − pL].
There are two deviations from the Pooling by battles profile: (i) P1
triggers A in the first period; we already dealt with this possibility in Lemma
A1. (ii) P1 makes an oﬀer at that period. The following Lemma shows that
if one uses optimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, a suﬃciently high discount
rate can avoid the latter deviation.
Lemma A3 There exist two threshold discount rates δ2 ≤ 1 and δ4 ≤ 1
such that if P2’s beliefs are µ(p = pL | h(1) 6= B) = 1 then Pooling with
partial separation and Full pooling by battles constitute a PBE if and only if
δ ≥ δ2 and δ ≥ δ4, respectively.
Proof. When optimistic beliefs are used, the type with the most incentives
to deviate is the L-type since the condition
1− θ(1− pL) ≤ δE[vi];
δ ≥ 1− θ(1− pL)
E[vi]
, i = L,H,
is required and E[vH ] ≥ E[vL]. Hence, new thresholds on the discount rate
are needed. When there is separation under D the new condition is
δ ≥ 1− θ(1− pL)
1− pLxV (2)− (1− pL)xL(2)
=
Q+ pL




δ ≥ 1− θ(1− pL)





(pH+pL)(2−pH−pL) [pH − pL]
= δ4,
when there is pooling under both outcomes. Both thresholds are increasing
and concave in Q. Easy algebra shows that δ2 > δ4 for any Q.





δ = max{δ1, δ2} if (1− q+)[pH − pL] ≤ Q ≤ (1− q−)[pH − pL];
δ = max{δ3, δ4} if (1− q−)[pH − pL] ≤ Q,
so if the discount rate is high enough and P2’s beliefs are optimistic, neither




The duration of events can be seen as a random variable T with its own
distribution function20
F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t),
specifying the probability that an event lasts less or equal than t. Symmet-
rically, the survivor function
S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t),
is the probability that the duration will exceed t.
20This subsection builds on Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988).
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The main object of interest when studying duration dependence is the
hazard rate
λ(t) = Pr[T = t | T ≥ t] = f(t)
S(t)
,
where f(t) is the density function of T. The hazard rate is thus a conditional
density function. An event is said to exhibit positive (negative) duration
dependence when its hazard rate increases (decreases) with duration.
We employ a competing risks model in order to investigate multiple ter-
mination modes. We consider two risks depending on whether contenders
reached a settlement, coded as s, or one of the sides was totally defeated,
coded as ns. Two risk-specific hazard rates
λr(t) = Pr[T = t, R = r | T ≥ t] r = s, ns,
are estimated, where observations whose termination mode is diﬀerent from
r are treated as censored at the point of termination.





The parametric estimation procedure assumes either a functional form
on f(t) or a particular specification of the hazard rate directly, and then
estimates λ(t) by maximum likelihood. The latter is the common practice in
discrete-time analysis like the one we perform in this paper21. In particular,
21We have some reservations against continuous-time specifications: (i) they often im-
pose strong distributional assumptions on the hazard rate; and, more importantly, (ii)
the data on wars are typically discrete. On the other hand, the Cox semiparametric spec-
ification imposes fewer restrictions than ours on the shape of the hazard rate because it
is not directly estimated. But this feature makes this model less valuable when duration
dependence is the main object of interest.
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we assume that the hazard rate takes the logistic functional form
λr(t) =
1
1 + exp−(αrXr + βrt)
r = s, ns, (10)
where Xr is a vector of cause-specific covariates and αr is the vector of
associated coeﬃcients. Duration dependence is captured by cause-specific
coeﬃcient βr. This model is thus quite flexible: Contrary to other specifi-
cations (like Weibull) it does not restrict the hazard to be monotonic.
B.2 The data
The 3.0 COW Extra-systemic dataset contains 109 military disputes22. We
dropped 16 cases due to the lack of information about some covariates.
There is an ongoing debate regarding the inclusion of several conflicts (and
the exclusion of others) in the database. We wanted to remain neutral in this
issue so the only change we made in the composition of the sample, following
Clodfelter (1992), Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) and Goldstein (1992), was to
split the Franco-Dahomeyan war into two conflicts. Table 3 below contains
all the cases included in the analysis.
We take one observation per war, measured at the start of the conflict.
We believe that this does not seriously limit our analysis. If time-varying
covariates were employed, they would not change much over time because
most of them are annual measures. Moreover, as Bennett and Stam (1996)
argue, the present approach allows us to predict the duration and termina-
tion mode of a conflict in a similar way to the involved parties since this was
the information available to them when the war began.
22This data set is publicly available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. An Extra-systemic war
is a military conflict that led to more than 1000 battle casualties and that was fought
between a state and an entity that did not qualify as such (e.g. a colony, a protectorate,
a tribe). A state is defined as a member of the United Nations or the League of Nations
or an entity with a population greater than 500,000 and recognized by two major powers.
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This dataset makes the construction of dyadic variables diﬃcult. Mea-
sures of relative strengths or the contenders’ regime-type match are not
available due to the lack of information about the non-state sides. When
needed, we solve this problem by assuming that all non-states were identical
in a certain characteristic. While this is a strong assumption in some dimen-
sions, it is not that implausible in others: Although not all the non-states
had the same regime-type, they were mostly perceived as non-democratic
by the democratic states fighting them (see Ravlo et al., 2003).
The variables employed in the analysis are:
Duration: The data from the COW dataset was cross-checked with Clod-
felter (1992) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993). When divergences appeared,
we gave priority to these sources since they are more accurate23. When the
start or end date where not precise, we took the average of the maximum
and minimum possible durations.
Agreement: The sources are Clodfelter (1992), Dupuy and Dupuy (1993)
and Goldstein (1992). Following the criteria employed24, 45 out of the 94
cases considered ended in a settlement.
Average deaths: We proxy the cost of continuing conflict with the non-
state’s monthly average of thousands of battle casualties. The data come
from the COW database, Clodfelter (1992) and Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).25
Stable democracy: There is evidence showing that democracies and au-
tocracies wage war diﬀerently. Democracies are less likely to support long
wars because the costs to their leaders increase over time (due to the exis-
23The original COW records were quite inaccurate probably because the interest of
scholars has been almost exclusively centered in the Interstate wars database.
24We consider that a war did not end in agreement when the state completely withdrew
due to a military defeat, when it stormed the capital of the opponent, or the latter totally
lost its autonomy or its population was annihilated. Even very unfavorable settlements for
the losers, like the acceptance of a protectorate status, are coded as agreements. Results
do not change if these less clear-cut cases were coded as ending in no agreement.
25The inclusion instead of the state’s average deaths yields almost identical results.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables considered
Variables Minimum M aximum Mean Std. deviation 
Duration  
Agreement 1    165 42.47 38.11 
         No agreement 1 114 23.14 38.20 
Independent variables  
Average Deaths 0.013 11.47 0.809 1.574 
Stable democracy  0 1 0.702  0.460 
Military personnel 0.005 4 0.448 0.558 
Casualties ratio 0.001 0.95 0.251 0.237 
Population 0.013 5.72 0.424 0.591 
Decolonization war 0 1 0.277 0.450 
Previous disputes 0 2 0.213 0.461 
Number of colonies 0 50 19.49 15.03 
tence of a public opinion and free press), so they tend to fight shorter wars
than autocracies. The state’s regime type can thus proxy the state’s cost of
war. We considered several measures of democracy proposed by Bennett and
Stam (1996) and Ravlo et al. (2003). Finally, we employed a dichotomous
variable coding a state as a stable democracy if at least ten years passed
since it became democratic.26
Relative strength: Under the assumption of equal-strength across the
non-state entities, measures of the state’ strength can be considered as prox-
ies for the dyadic concept of relative power. We follow Bennett and Stam
(1996) and include:
(i) Population: Measures the state’s population in hundred of millions.27
(ii) Military personnel: Measures the state’s total military personnel in
millions of soldiers.
26The basis of this measure is the widely used Polity IV Democracy score running from
0 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). We are aware of the potential flaws of any measure
of Democracy. The Polity score focuses only on the "institutional" characteristics of a
democracy and does not record other important elements like the extent of the suﬀrage.
Within this limits, it is nevertheless a consistent measure, available for most countries
since 1800. We used +3 as the cut-oﬀ to describe a state as democratic.
27A sharper indicator woud have been military-age population. However, such data was
not available. The inclusion of urban population instead had no impact in the results.
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Finally, we consider a third, truly dyadic variable:
(iii) State’s casualties ratio: We divide the state’s battle deaths by the
total of battle deaths as a measure of the non-state’s strength. Again,
the data come from The COW database, Clodfelter (1992) and Lacina
and Gleditsch (2005).
Decolonization war: Conflicts in the sample are too heterogeneous;
they can be structurally diﬀerent. Following Ravlo et al. (2003), we pro-
pose three categories: Colonial if the war was fought in the period 1816-1870;
Imperial if it was fought in the period 1871-1918; and of Decolonization oth-
erwise. Preliminary results showed that the first two categories were not
statistically diﬀerent. Therefore, we only included a dummy taking value 1
if the war belongs to the Decolonization period and 0 otherwise.
Previous disputes: Counts the number of disputes between the two sides
in the 25 years before the war. We conjecture that more disputes make fur-
ther conflicts shorter because part of the "learning" process is already done.
Hence, we expect more disputes to be associated with shorter durations.
Number of colonies: When confronting a non-state entity, states may
have reputational concerns with respect to other non-states they may en-
counter in the future or they may fear that the loss of one colony can trigger
independence attempts by other possessions. This can aﬀect their willing-
ness to settle or to fight a protracted conflict. We follow the criteria of Ravlo
et al. (2003) when calculating the number of colonies owned by each state.
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Table 3:
Extra-systemic wars in the sample, 1817-1988







British-M ahrattan United K ingdom vs. M ahrattas 1817 1818 7









British-Ashanti of 1824 1824 1826 31
Dutch-Javanese 1825 1830 57
British-Bharatpuran 1825 1826 1
Russo-Persian 1826 1828 20
British-Zulu of 1838 1838 1840 25
British-Afghan of 1839 1839 1842 42
First Opium 1839 1842 36









Uruguyan D ispute 1845 1852 86
Franco-M oroccan 1844 1844 1
British-Sikh of 1845 1845 1846 3
Cracow Revolt 1846 1846 1
British-Sikh of 1848 1848 1849 5
British-K affir of 1850 1850 1853 37
British-Burmese of 1852 1852 1853 10
British-Santal 1855 1856 12
Second Opium 1856 1860 49
Indian M utiny 1857 1859 23
Argentine-Buenos Aires 1859 1859 5
British-M aorin 1860 1870 122
Spanish-Santo Dominican 1863 1865 15
British-Bhutanese 1865 1865 10
British-Ethiopian 1867 1868 4
Spanish-Cuban of 1868 1868 1878 114
British-Ashanti of 1873 1873 1874 14
Franco-Tonkin 1873 1874 3
Dutch-Achinese 1873 1878 66
Egypto-Ethiopian 1875 1876 5
British-Afghan of 1878 1878 1880 22
Bosnian 1878 1878 2
Russo-Turkoman 1879 1881 19
British-Zulu of 1879 1879 1879 6
Gun W ar 1880 1881 8
Boer W ar of 1880 1880 1881 3
Franco-Tunisian of 1881 1881 1882 14
Franco-Indochinese of 1882 1882 1883 16
British-M ahdi 1882 1885 31
Franco-M adagascan of 1883 1883 1885 31
British-Burmese of 1885 1885 1886 2
M andigo 1885 1886 12
Serbo-Bulgarian 1885 1886 4
Italo-Ethiopian of 1887 1887 1887 1
First Franco-Dahomeyan
United K ingdom vs. Kandyan rebels
O ttoman Empire vs. Persia
United K ingdom vs. Burma
United K ingdom vs. Ashanti tribe
Netherlands vs. Java kingdom
United K ingdom vs. Bharatpur
Russia vs. Persia
United K ingdom vs. Zulu tribe
United K ingdom vs. Afghan tribes
United K ingdom vs. China
France vs. Algerian tribes
Peru vs. Bolivia
United K ingdom vs. Sind Army
France &  United K ingdom vs. Uruguay
France vs. M oroccan resistance
United K ingdom vs. Sikhs
Austria-Hungary vs. Polish rebels
United K ingdom vs. Sikhs
United K ingdom vs. Kaffirs
United K ingdom vs. Burma
United K ingdom vs. Santals
France &  United K ingdom vs. China
United K ingdom vs. Indian sepoys
Argentina vs. Buenos Aires secessionists
United K ingdom vs. M aori
Spain vs. Santo Domingo
United K ingdom vs. Bhutan
United K ingdom vs. Ethiopia
Spain vs. Cuba
United K ingdom vs. Ashanti tribe
France vs. Vietnam
Netherlands vs. Aceh sultanate
Egypt vs. Ethiopia
United K ingdom vs. Afghan tribes
Austria-Hungary vs. Bosnia
Russia vs. Turkomans
United K ingdom vs. Zulu tribe
United K ingdom vs. Basuto
United K ingdom vs. Transvaal
France vs. Tunisia
France vs. Annam
United K ingdom vs. M ahdist
France vs. M adagascar
United K ingdom vs. Burma
France vs. M andinga
Serbia vs. Bulgaria
Italy vs. Ethiopia














France vs. Dahomey kingdom
Belgium vs. Congo














Franco-Madagascan of 1894 France vs. Madagascar 1894 1895 10
Spanish-Cuban of 1895 Spain vs. Cuba 1895 1898 38
Japano-Taiwanese Japan vs. Taiwan 1895 1895 5
Italo-Ethiopian of 1895 1895 1896 11
Spanish-Philippino of 1896 1896  1898 23
Mahdi Uprising 1896 1899 42
British-Nigerian 1897 1897 1
Indian Muslim 1897 1898 9
American-Philippino 1899 1902 42
Somali Rebellion 1899 1905 67
Boer War of 1899 1899 1902 32
Conquest of Kano & Sokoto 1903 1903 6
South West African Revolt 1904 1905 22
Maji-Maji Revolt 1905 1906 11
British-Zulu of 1906 1906 1906 4
Moroccan of 1911 1911 1912 13
Caco Revolt 1918 1920 19
British-Afghan of 1919 1919 1919 2
Iraqi-British 1920 1921 14




France & United Kingdom vs. Mahdist
United Kingdom vs. Nigeria
United Kingdom vs. Indian-Muslims
United States vs. Philippines
United Kingdom vs. Mad Mullah army
United Kingdom vs. Boer
United Kingdom vs. Kano & Sokoto sultanates
Germany vs. Herero & Nama tribes
Germany vs. Tanganyka
United Kingdom vs. Zulu tribe
France & Spain vs. Morocco
United States vs. Haiti
United Kingdom vs. afghan tribes
United Kingdom vs. Iraqi Arabs
United Kingdom vs. Moplah
France & Spain vs. Morocco 1921 1926 64
Italo-Libyan 1923 1932  107
Franco-Druze 1925 1927 23
Saya San's Rebellion 1930 1932 18
British-Palestinian 1936 1939 37
Indonesian 1945 1949 49
Franco-Indochinese of 1945 1946 1954 93
Franco-Madagascan of 1947 1947 1948 20
Malayan Rebellion 1948 1957 112
Sino-Tibetan of 1950 1950 1951  8
Franco-Tunisian of 1952 1952 1955 39
British-Mau Mau 1952 1956 39
Moroccan Independence 1953 1956 31
Franco-Algerian of 1954 1954 1962 90
Cameroon 1955 1960 55
Angolan-Portugese 1961 1974 165
Guinean-Portugese 1963 1974 140
Mozambique-Portugese 1964 1974 121





United Kingdom vs. Burmese rebels
United Kingdom vs. Palestina
Netherlands & United Kingdom vs. Indonesia
France vs. Vietminh
France vs. Madagascar
United Kingdom vs. Malaysia
China vs. Tibet
France vs. Tunisia
United Kingdom vs. Kenya
France & Spain vs. Morocco
France vs. Algeria





South Africa vs. Namibia
Mauritania & Morocco vs. Polisario
1975
1975
1988
1983
156
98
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